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O F T H E 
S T A T E O F U T A H 
TOM POLK and RON SHULTZ, 
P l a i n t i f f s and Appe l lants , 
vs 
MIKE T. IVERS and 
MRS. MIKE T. IVERS, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 14682 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action, brought by Appellants, seeks damages 
for forcible entry and forcible detainer and for damage 
caused to the Plaintiffs' personal property by actions of 
the Defendants. 
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4 
II i 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted the Defendants' Motion ' 
to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Complaint and the Defendants' 
Counterclaim for lack of prosecution. 
4 
III 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
i 
Plaintiffs-Appellants seek reversal of the lower 
court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' Complaint and a remand 
of the action to the lower court for trial. 
IV 
4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arose from a landlord-tenant dispute 
between Plaintiffs and Defendants. The Plaintiff lessees 
filed a complaint in forcible entry against the Defendant 
landlords on January 22, 1974 in Third District Court in 
Salt Lake City, Utah.(R.l) Service was made upon both 
Defendants the following day.(R.7) Defendants through 
counsel, Wendell R. Jones, answered on February 6, 1974.(R.11) 
Plaintiffs submitted a first set of interrogatories on 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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February " " L'j/. 'R.8) ^ollcve1 V -tziir^s r:c *dnus = ::>ns 
two days later (R.1H' On March x "' - - * ;h 
new '^ undei ' dar* . ™ov^- „:
 s <. .^nge L ." ve*- t. 
from Salt Lake Counrv .J :^min: ~
 Mir — o ^» <-^ ich motion 
wa s iJ r -in r: tj rl Mi11 • 11 I - r cnua r . t <? 
Liieti a second answer widi counterclaim (R.32) and answers 
to thia February Jl. 1974 interrogator i HS IK MI iml njiJ"I i 
i n inn i"ebr;uraiy LJi.h requests for; admissions.(R.35) On 
dune L8» 1974 Defendants filed notice of readiness fnr 
trial h Sth five dd\:-, aL'u-r I lu> P 1 i uitifiis had answuied 
Defendants* counterclaim, t'R. 49) On July 5th, 1974, Plaintiffs 
submitted a second sot" of i ntern -t^af lines iR KJ2) rOiich a/ere 
:::rvt red August J, !'•> /4, < R , V) » On July 31, 1974 Defendants 
made request for a trial setting;, CR 59) and ^he ]vf i r ^,ii 
"•i-' i |'"n^ -ii;ijj - K hiudry 1J J1,1,'; m Provo, LJLah.'R oO) 
At the pre-trial, counsel were ordered to prepare a pre-
trial order whioh wa^ i f i ln-i ^ i j hm l i ini I I f}i_ LJUII tor 
appro1* a i by Apr L J. J L975, jury instructions were to be 
submitted by July 28, 1975; and q trial date of Tulv l'1, 
l^7r ,i, r^"t R 6}) riaiiiLit'xs " counsel submitted the 
requested jury instructions by Julv -3f LQ 7 3 in accordance 
with the Februarv ! i, I Q ^ , ^ Vr '* ;1 ' r'pfendanf » ila not. 
'Jii" '. •. lailure ot counsel Jo agree on a ire-trial order, 
the July 30, 1975 t ri.itl dr»te wi; seated P N > '"• - Pei. ember 
I"1, I1'1* i lieai m;f) v*db ' J Iiave jeeo laid Lo sec a new trial 
date. Plaintiffs1 counsel was unable to be present but 
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informed the Court by letter filed December 9, 1975 that he f 
would not be able to attend and that he would be amenable 
for trial anytime during February or March, 1976.(R.90) 
Defendants1 counsel did not appear in court or otherwise 1 
notify the court of a convenient date. The minute entry 
reflects that the court would contact counsel and set a 
trial date.(R.91) No further action was taken until Defendants * 
moved for dismissal for failure to prosecute on June 1, 
1976.(R.94) No notice of hearing on the motion was made at 
that time. Nevertheless, the court without a hearing, and ^ 
with no counsel present granted the motion on June 7, 1976 
and requested Defendants1 counsel to prepare an order of 
dismissal.(R.96) Plaintiffs' counsel received a copy of the 
proposed order on June 9, 1976 (R.96) and requested Defendants1 
counsel for a hearing before the order was signed, which 
hearing was set for June 21, 1976.(R.97) On June 14, 1976 
Plaintiffs1 counsel filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment on the liability issue.(R.98) At the June 21, 1976 
hearing, Plaintiffs1 counsel was not present but informed 
the court by telephone he would not appear and that he would 
submit the matter on the record. Despite the motion for 
partial summary judgment filed a week earlier, the extensive 
discovery completed by Plaintiffs and the irregularity of 
the June 7, 1976 proceeding, the court, Judge Stewart M. 
Hanson, presiding, dismissed Plaintiffs1 complaint with 
prejudice for want of prosecution.(R.101) Timely appeal was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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taken.(R.104) 
V 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE, 
The court below had the power under Rule 41(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss Plaintiffs' 
action for want of prosecution. The issue is whether the 
court abused its discretion in doing so in this case. When 
faced with a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution a 
court must weigh three separate and often conflicting interests: 
1) the interest of the Plaintiff in having 
his claim heard on its merits 
2) the interest of the Defendant in being 
protected from vexatious delays and possible 
impairment of his defenses by the passage of 
time, and 
3) the interest of the court in eliminating 
"deadweight" cases from its docket. 
Plaintiffs1 position is that the court below arbitrarily 
sacrificed their fundamental right to a judicial hearing to 
less compelling interests which could have been adequately 
protected by far less stringent sanctions than dismissal. 
In Westinghouse Electric Supply v Larsen 544 P.2d 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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876(1975) this Court emphasized the primacy of a party's 
right to be heard: 
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with 
dispatch and to move calendars with expedition in 
order to keep them up to date. But it is even 
more important to keep in mind that the very 
reason for the existence of courts is to afford 
disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do 
justice between them . . . It is our conclusion 
that the trial court failed to give proper weight 
to the higher priority; and that under the circum-
stances described herein, the order of dismissal 
was an abuse of discretion. 
The Westinghouse case stands for the proposition that a 
dismissal for want of prosecution is not to be granted 
unless there are interests substantially outweighing the 
Plaintiffs' right to be heard. What are the interests in 
the case at bar. 
No significant harm to the Defendants appears from 
the record. Any neglect by Plaintiffs' counsel could not 
possibly have harmed the Defendants more than the Defendants' 
failure to conduct any form of discovery recognized under 
the Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, any other interests 
the Defendants might have had clearly were not significant 
factors in Judge Hanson's decision, since the court originally 
granted Defendants' motion without a hearing. 
Justification for the lower court's ruling must be 
found, if at all, in its power to weed out "deadweight" 
cases from its calendar. Was this case "deadweight"? 
Several facts point to a negative answer. First, Plaintiffs 
had filed a motion for summary judgment on June 14, 1976 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(R.98) - one week before Judge Hanson signed the order of 
dismissal. Second, the letter dated December 9, 1975 and 
filed December 12, 1975 from Plaintiffs1 counsel to the 
court clearly indicated he was ready for trial nanytime 
during the months of February or March, 1976".(R.90) Third, 
Plaintiff had completed extensive discovery (two sets of 
interrogatories and one set of requests for admission). 
(R.8,12,52) Fourth, a proposed pre-trial order by Plaintiffs 
was on file (R.65-70) as well as Plaintiffs1 requests for 
jury instructions.(R.71-89) Fifth, the court had indicated 
on December 15, 1975 that the court would contact the 
counsel to set a trial date (R.91) which was never done. 
Sixth, the case was simply not that old. The complaint was 
filed January 22, 1974, and because of a change in venue, 
the answer was not filed until six months later. The cases 
in which this Court have affirmed dismissals for want of 
prosecution have generally involved much longer delays. See 
for example: Brasher Motor v Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 
P.2d 464 (1969) five and one-half years, Thompson Ditch 
Company v Jackson, 29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528 (1973) five 
years. Maxfield v Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (1975) was only a 
two year case, but therein the Plaintiff had conducted 
either minimal or no discovery of his own, was dilatory in 
responding to Defendants f interrogatories and showed up for 
trial without an essential expert witness. 
In the case at bar there are no factors showing 
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excessive dilatory conduct by Plaintiffs1 counsel. During 
the ten months between the vacating of the July 30, 1975 
trial date and the filing of Defendants1 motion to dismiss, 
the case was basically dormant. There is no compelling 
excuse for such a delay other than Plaintiffs' counsel was 
awaiting action by Defendants' counsel and the court toward 
resolving the question of the pre-trial order and a trial 
setting. Plaintiffs' counsel did not appear at the June 21, 
1976 hearing immediately before the court signed its order 
of dismissal (counsel did, however, inform the court he 
would submit the matter on the pleadings). Other than the 
foregoing, all delays were the fault of the Defendants or 
the court. 
Even so, Plaintiffs maintain there was sufficient 
activity in the file to avoid a motion to dismiss. Granting 
such a motion, especially with prejudice, is a harsh sanction 
to be used sparingly. The court below could have adequately 
protected its interests by ordering Plaintiffs to bring the 
case to trial by some day certain. Such orders are commonly 
used and are an attractive method of clearing up clogged 
calendars without denying a party his day in court. 
The Plaintiffs had, on June 29, 1975, submitted a 
proposed pre-trial order and proposed a meeting to resolve 
any questions within the order.(R.64) That meeting was 
never held. 
The court had indicated to counsel by its minute 
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entry on December 15, 1975 (R.91) that they would be contacted 
regarding a new trial date. That was never done. 
Plaintiffs' counsel had attempted to move the 
matter to trial with dispatch and resolve the apparent 
dispute regarding the pre-trial order. Neither Defendants' 
counsel nor the court moved in that direction. The Plaintiffs 
should not be penalized for the failure to act of the court 
or Defendants' counsel. 
In sum, the lower court abused its discretion in 
granting Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution 
under the circumstances of this case. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM WITH PREJUDICE. 
The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing 
Plaintiffs' claim with prejudice because such action excessive 
penalized the Plaintiffs. The Statute of Limitations has 
not run on Plaintiffs' claim whether it be viewed as a 
forcible entry action (four years - U.C.A. §78-12-25), an 
action to recover possession of real property (seven years -
U.C.A. §78-12-5) or an action for injuring personal property 
(three years - U.C.A. §78-12-26). Proper respect for the 
Plaintiffs' constitutional right to a judicial resolution of 
their claim (Utah Constitution, Article I, §11) would mandate 
that a court dismissing for lack of prosecution do so without 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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prejudice when the statute of limitations has not run on the 
claim. 
VI < 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court abused its discretion in dismissing * 
Plaintiffs' claim for want of prosecution. The lack of 
prosecution was on the part of Defendants' counsel and the 
court rather than Plaintiffs. The decision of the lower ' 
court should be reversed and the matter remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
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